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ABSTRACT 
Zoila Ponce de León Seijas: The Politics of Health Reform in Latin America: Agenda Setting 
and Decision Making in Chile and Peru 
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber) 
 
This paper examines the process of decision making of two policies aiming to universalize the 
access to health services: AUGE in Chile under President Lagos, and AUS in Peru under the 
García Administration. I incorporate the strength of the programmatic nature of political parties 
as an independent variable explaining the difference in the process of decision making and final 
policy outputs. The role of party leadership together with programmatic commitments is found to 
be important for the agenda setting process. Further, a systematic analysis of floor debates finds 
the presence of programmatic political parties of the left and right to lead to an exhaustive 
debate. Finally, the presence of programmatic political parties in Chile is found to lead to a 
policy with clear definitions and viable objectives, which had important implications for its 
further implementation. Conversely, weakly programmatic parties led to a poorly specified 
policy in Peru, which negatively impacted its implementation. 
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Introduction 
Scholars studying the development of social policy in Latin America have focused on countries 
such as Chile, Uruguay (Huber et al. 2010, Pribble and Huber 2011, Pribble 2013), and Costa 
Rica (Clark 2004). In these countries, political parties of the left, who promoted health reforms, 
aimed at the universalization of the distribution of health services to their populations. However, 
there is a pending research agenda in the study of universal health reform in countries without 
strong left-wing parties and in which parties of the center-right have led the reform, such as Peru, 
Colombia, or Mexico.  
In Latin America, we have seen the disappearance of many programmatic political parties 
and the development of weakly and non-programmatic ones (Levitsky 2001, Mainwaring and 
Zoco 2007, Kitschelt et al. 2010). According to Kitschelt et al. (2010), Chile and Uruguay are the 
only remaining countries that have strongly programmatic political parties, whereas parties in 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru qualify as weakly programmatic. Surprisingly, this phenomenon has 
been overlooked in terms of policy decision making.  
This paper incorporates the strength of the programmatic nature of political parties as an 
independent variable explaining the difference in the process of decision making and its final 
outputs. In a comparative analysis of Chile and Peru, the role of party leadership together with 
programmatic commitments is found to be important for the agenda setting process of universal 
health reform in these countries. Furthermore, a systematic analysis of floor debates finds the 
presence of programmatic political parties of the left and right leading to an exhaustive 
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deliberative process. Finally, the presence of programmatic political parties in Chile is found to 
lead to a policy with clear definitions and viable objectives, which had important implications for 
its further implementation and ultimately generated equity in the health system. Conversely, 
weakly programmatic parties led to a poorly specified policy in terms of which and what number 
of diseases would be covered, which negatively impacted its implementation and had limited 
effects on the unequal health system in Peru.  
The first section of the paper explains the state of the healthcare systems in Peru and 
Chile before the introduction of the reforms and describes the core of the proposals in each 
country and the parties and coalitions that originally crafted them. A second short section 
develops a comparison of congressional procedures in each country. The third section develops 
the theory about the programmatic nature of political parties and its impact on policymaking. 
The next two sections develop an empirical analysis of the processes of agenda setting, debate, 
and choice in these countries. An analysis of media coverage for the Chilean case
1
 and 
congressional debates from both Chile and Peru is carried out. A final section looks at the 
implications of the policy decision making process on the implementation of the reforms. 
 
I. Health Sector Reform: AUGE and AUS 
Chile and Peru each have two different health care subsystems: a private one that depends on the 
financial resources of those who use it, and a public one that is dependent on state resources. In 
Chile, the private sector became more important for the provision of health care services and 
insurance during Augusto Pinochet’s government in the 1980s. In Peru, during Alberto 
                                                          
1
 Data is not available for the Peruvian case. 
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Fujimori’s government, a law was enacted in 1997 allowing private networks of health clinics 
and hospitals to compete with the public health system. In both cases, the introduction of the 
private sector as a key actor in health care occurred as part of a main shift towards neoliberal 
policies encouraged by International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  
 Like many Latin American countries, some of the main problems Chile and Peru suffered 
in the public health sector are precarious infrastructure, shortage of human resources and 
technology that causes long waiting lists, low salaries for professionals which encourages them 
to move to the private sector, access problems, and low quality of services. On the other side, the 
discretionary power the private sector enjoyed led to a constant increase in care plans’ prices, 
unstable and often confusing rules, and discrimination against people with high risk or 
potentially higher costs like women, and the elderly. 
 Before the introduction of the private sector, the Chilean health sector consisted of three 
institutions: the Ministry of Health, the National Health Service (SNS), and the white collar 
workers’ fund, Servicio Médico Nacional para Empleados (SERMENA). While SNS provided 
health care for the entire population (mainly covering blue-collar workers and the poor) and was 
financed in part by the state; the SERMENA covered white-collar workers and was financed by 
employees (Dávila 2005). The major consequence of this scenario was a great level of 
segmentation within the Chilean health care sector. 
 Peru’s health system was also segmented into different systems: the public health system 
run by the Ministry of Health for uninsured people and indigents, and the state social health 
insurance run by IPSS (today ESSALUD) for formal-sector workers. This meant that the 
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majority of the population resorted to the public health system, depending on the network of 
medical posts and hospitals run by the ministry (Ewig 2004). 
 A commonality present between the reforms in which Pinochet and Fujimori engaged 
respectively is that social policy was not a main priority. Health was subordinated to fighting 
poverty and pushing economic growth. In both countries, the governments allowed and 
encouraged the participation of the private sector in the provision of health care services. Private 
sector providers in Chile and Peru emerged without many regulations, constituting a powerful 
group that has shaped health sector reform in both countries. 
 Health care reform under Pinochet’s government began in 1979. The National Health 
Service and SERMENA were combined into the National Health Fund (FONASA) to collect and 
distribute public health care funds. Moreover, the military regime created the Instituciones de 
Salud Previsional (ISAPRES) in 1981, which could offer alternative private insurance and 
services for workers, thus competing with the public sector. Workers were able to choose 
between allocating their compulsory contributions to FONASA or to ISAPRES (Pribble 2013). 
These institutions were free to decide the services they offered, and the deseases they covered. In 
general, income levels and the probability of disease determined the access to health care in 
Chile. Thus, FONASA tended to group people with low income and with higher medical risk, 
while ISAPRES attracted people with higher income and lower health risk (Titelman 1999). 
Further, this model enabled the private sector to influence the design and implementation of 
governmental policies (Dávila 2005). 
 According to Ewig (2004), different reforms under Fujimori’s government were 
developed in isolation from each other and by small groups of specialists. Moreover, IFIs 
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determined whether reforms were possible at all through loan agreements, and they set them 
within neoliberal principles
2
. The introduction of private sector competition into social security 
health care was achieved through Health Provider Entities (EPSs). A law enacted in 1997 
allowed these private networks of health clinics and hospitals to offer health care insurance and 
provision to workers who were previously covered by the national health insurance. Thus, the 
role of the state as a health service provider was reduced, allowing private health care companies 
to compete with it. However, private providers only provided primary and secondary care. More 
complex and hence expensive care has always been reserved for the state system (Ewig 2004). 
 In 2001, the Peruvian government created the Comprehensive Health Insurance (Seguro 
Integral de Salud, SIS), integrating two previous state insurance programs: the Free School 
Health Insurance and the Maternity Child Insurance. In 2005, SIS expanded its coverage to the 
rest of the population that were in a condition of poverty and extreme poverty.
3
 
 The public sectors in Peru and Chile were in charge of the provision of health care and 
insurance for the majority of their citizens, and especially incurred most of the risk of the system. 
However, these sectors’ financial resources, based on state transfers and share contributions, 
were not enough to cover their enormous demand. 
 Since the return to democracy, in 1990 in Chile and in 2000 in Peru, a reform of the 
health sector has always been a preeminent issue on the public agenda due to the fragmentation 
of the system (public and private) and the lack of resources. However, it was not until Ricardo 
Lagos’ government in Chile and Alan García’s term in Peru that a move towards universalism 
                                                          
2
 Mainly IDB, also the World Bank, USAID, and DFID. 
3
 SIS is completely subsidized for the very poor (quintiles 1 and 2) and semi-subsidized for those with limited 
financial resources (quintile 3). Its resources come from general taxes. 
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got onto the political agenda and passed a vote in Congress: the Chilean Universal Access with 
Explicit Guarantees (Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas, AUGE) and the Peruvian 
Universal Health Insurance (Aseguramiento Universal en Salud, AUS). 
 The AUGE Plan, as it was called, proposed a set of benefits and guarantees for the 
coverage of 56 diseases within a specific timetable. Chileans would have the same access to 
health care in this number of diseases, regardless of the provider sector. The creation of a 
Solidarity Fund was part of the policy proposal, which was meant to be a mechanism of 
redistribution of the costs of AUGE across affiliates of the public and private sectors. Also, a 
Maternity Fund intended to cover maternity leave that would be financed by members of the 
public and private sector. 
 AUS was intended to establish a regulatory support that ensured the right of every 
Peruvian to health care. It proposed the funding of an Essential Plan for Health Insurance (Plan 
Esencial de Aseguramiento en Salud, PEAS), a set of benefits and guarantees of health services 
that all citizens would have access to for a prioritized list of diseases, under the public and 
private sector. Thus, it would ensure quality and timely services for all diseases and conditions 
defined in this plan, but the bill did not specify how many or which diseases it would cover.  
 Although the bills look to generate a very similar reform of their respective health care 
systems, to provide universal access under equitable standards of quality and attention, the 
proposals, the policy decision making process that they went through, and the final policy 
choices made were very different. 
In Chile, a health reform envisioned to enhance equality was a clear priority for President 
Lagos, leader of Concertación, a coalition of center and left parties which was formed in 1988 as 
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opposition to Pinochet’s dictatorship. The coalition was formed by the Christian Democratic 
Party (PDC), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Socialist Party (PS), and the Radical Social 
Democratic Party (PRSD). These parties rely on programmatic linkages to gain support from 
their electorate (Pribble 2013, Kitschelt et al. 2010). The coalition was in government during 
four consecutive periods, with the Christian Democrats Patricio Aylwin (1990-94) and Eduardo 
Frei (1994-2000), the founder of PPD Ricardo Lagos (2000-06), and the Socialist Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010).  
AUGE was a key part of the proposals made during Lagos’ presidential campaign. 
(Dávila 2005), as his government program To Growth with Equality (Para Crecer con Igualdad) 
shows –coming third after economic growth and education. The document details that a true 
reform would need the establishment of timely and quality services that all Chileans would be 
entitled to. The program also promises the creation of a Solidarity Fund (Fondo Solidario) that 
would consist of state transfers and citizens’ contributions. Early in his term, Lagos established 
the Comisión para la Reforma, an inter-ministerial commission in charge of the study and 
proposal of the health system reform. In May 2002, Lagos officially announced the AUGE law 
proposal during his annual speech, and the bill was sent to Congress.  
In Peru, the push to set AUS in the political agenda came from the center-right Partido 
Aprista Peruano (APRA). Members of the party crafted different proposals which were part of 
the final bill the Executive sent to Congress under the initiative of the party leader, Alan García. 
APRA, one of the few Peruvian parties that survived the collapse of the party system in the early 
1990s, has been in government twice under the leadership of García (1985-90, and 2006-11). 
Even though APRA originated as a left party in the 1920s, the party has shifted towards the right, 
which was particularly clear under García’s last term. Political parties in Peru are mainly based 
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on charismatic candidates and not on programmatic commitments (Levitsky and Way 2003, 
Tanaka 2005). 
President García established a multi-sector commission in February 2008, chaired by the 
Ministry of Health and with the participation of the Ministry of Defense, the Home Office, and 
ESSALUD. The commission was in charge of elaborating the AUS bill, and a plan of 
implementation for the Essential Plan for Health Insurance (PEAS). The García administration 
sent the AUS proposal to Congress in December 2008. According to García, AUS would put an 
end to discrimination and exclusion in the country since it would ensure that every Peruvian, no 
matter their income, had access to quality care.  
 
II. Parliamentary Institutions 
Key institutional differences between the Chilean and Peruvian legislature are important to take 
into account. The first one is that the Chilean Congress is composed by the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate, whereas the Peruvian Congress is unicameral.  
In Chile, the policy decision process has different stages. First, a bill is discussed and 
voted on by the permanent committees in the Chamber of Deputies, which can make 
amendments to the bill. Then, it proceeds to a first floor debate and voting called General 
Discussion (Discusión General). Once approved, the bill has a second floor debate but this time 
each individual article of the bill that was amended is voted on, a process called Specific 
Discussion (Discussion Particular). In a fourth stage, the bill is sent to the permanent 
committees in the Senate to be discussed and voted on. The approved bill proceeds to General 
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Discussion this time at the Senate, followed by a Specific Discussion. Finally, the bill the Senate 
approved goes back to floor debate at the Chamber of Deputies for a final vote.  
In Peru, policy proposals go through two stages. First, the bills are assigned to permanent 
legislative committees, in which they get discussed, amended, and put to vote by the committee 
members. The approved bills are then debated and put to vote on the floor. 
This central institutional difference played an important role in the policymaking process 
of health reform in Chile and Peru. Institutional procedures, in relationship with other important 
factors such as the programmatic nature of political parties, were important in determining the 
length of time that AUGE and AUS were discussed respectively, as well as the depth of the 
discussions that the bills went through. 
 
III. Political Parties and Policymaking 
Political parties play key roles in forming governments, organizing the work of the legislature, 
and articulating and aggregating citizens’ interests and preferences (Sartori 1976, Aldrich 1995, 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Scholars find that the location of political parties in the left-right 
spectrum is pertinent to the allocation of attention towards certain issues and thus for public 
spending (Castles 1982; Blais et al. 1996). Following this argument, left-wing parties are 
expected to be more inclined to pay attention to and spend on the development of the welfare 
state and the generation of equality than right-wing parties. Along these lines, we could expect to 
find universal expansion of social benefits being promoted by governments of the left. 
 Different studies about Latin America have focused on the development of health reforms 
in countries such as Chile, Uruguay (Huber et al. 2010, Pribble and Huber 2011, Pribble 2013), 
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and Costa Rica (Clark 2004). In these countries, political parties of the left promoted health 
reform, aiming at the universalization of the distribution of health services to their populations. 
However, there is a pending research agenda in the study of universal health reform in countries 
without strong left-wing parties and in which parties of the center-right have led the reform. Such 
are the cases of Peru, Colombia, or Mexico. Ideology is an important variable to explain the 
impact of political parties on policy choice. However, we should not overlook the interaction of 
this variable with the programmatic nature of political parties, the effect of party discipline, and 
the role of party leadership. 
A political party is programmatic when it organizes itself, seeks to attract votes, and has 
links to citizens on the basis of a set of policies that define the party; whereas weakly 
programmatic parties, even when still using programmatic appeals, are mainly based on other 
types of appeals, such as charismatic attraction and clientelistic exchanges (Kitschelt et al. 2010).  
In Latin America, we have seen the disappearance of many programmatic political parties 
and the development of weakly or non-programmatic ones (Levitsky 2001, Mainwaring and 
Zoco 2007, Kitschelt et al. 2010). According to measures devised by Kitschelt et al. (2010), 
Chile and Uruguay are the only remaining countries that have strongly programmatic political 
parties, whereas parties in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru qualify as weakly programmatic. 
Surprisingly, this phenomenon has been overlooked in terms of policy decision making. I 
propose the incorporation of the strength of the programmatic nature of political parties as an 
independent variable explaining the different outputs we can observe in policy decision making. 
The programmatic nature of parties has impact on both the process of policymaking and the final 
policy choices. 
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The presence of programmatic political parties has two main effects on the policymaking 
process: (1) at the party level and (2) at the party system level. First, members of programmatic 
parties legislate on policy proposals along the ideological guidelines that define their party. 
When party members, including the top leaders, have the role of policy proposer, they follow the 
programmatic commitments of the party. Therefore, the bills introduced and the debate that 
follows goes along with the party program. If the party has the role of opposition to a particular 
policy, the members will play this role also under the programmatic guidelines of the party. In 
both scenarios, there is a programmatic party pressure enforcing this dynamic. Second, a party 
system composed by different programmatic parties propels a more deliberative process since 
each party has clearly set commitments to its program and hence advocates for them. 
On the contrary, when political parties are weakly programmatic, their loose ideological 
commitments translate into loosely defined policy proposals. A weakly programmatic opposition 
party’s members may contend a certain policy appealing to different arguments that do not 
necessarily align with their party program. At the party system level, the absence or low levels of 
programmatic competition discourages the development of an exhaustive deliberative process. 
Moreover, the role played by the leadership of the party gains more leverage in the context of 
weakly programmatic parties, serving many times as a replacement of programmatic 
commitments.  
Regarding policy choices, programmatic parties push for policies that have clear 
definitions and viable objectives, thus clearly defining its further implementation. On the 
contrary, weakly programmatic parties lead to poorly specified policies with unclear objectives 
that hinder their own implementation. These policies mainly seek to gain popularity for 
individual leaders or the party label. When it comes to health policy, good policy outputs, which 
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are formulated to and extend better heath to significant numbers of people, are favored by the 
presence of programmatic parties of the left and center-left. 
Consistent majorities and disciplined parties promote governmental decisiveness (Cox 
and McCubbins 2001). The ability of the party elite to enforce discipline within their party’s 
ranks in the legislature has an important effect on their success in advancing their legislative 
agendas (IDB 2006). Party discipline is usually associated with other partisan attributes such as 
institutionalization and the programmatic nature of political parties. However, we can find 
influential leaders generating voting unity (Morgenstern 2004) not only within programmatic 
parties, but also weakly or non-programmatic ones. The party discipline variable interacts with 
the programmatic nature of political parties to define the process of debate and final policy 
outputs. 
The presence of discipline within a party develops in a different way and has distinct 
consequences if the parties are programmatic in comparison to weakly programmatic. In both 
cases, party leaders can enforce obedience during the policy decision making process. However, 
when the party is programmatic this obedience occurs under a set of guidelines and commitments 
that the party members share, based on their party platform. Therefore, legislators support elite 
agendas (for instance, presidential agendas) as long as they are in line with their shared 
commitments. On the other side, within weakly programmatic parties, there is a sort of 
obedience in the vacuum. Party members follow the leaders’ decisions and their idiosyncratic 
guidelines since they do not have partisan guidelines that could collide with them. In that 
context, political parties are weakened by the personal and pervasive accumulation of power in 
the hands of a single individual. 
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IV. Agenda Setting 
For Jones and Baumgartner (2005), the policy decision making process can be laid out in 
different stages. First, there is a process of agenda setting during which recognition of a problem 
occurs. Following Kingdon (2010), a particular idea becomes prominent and the “policy 
window” opens for those issues that have succeeded in gaining attention from politicians. 
Second, the problem definition occurs, determining how an issue will be understood or defined 
by the different attributes that are incorporated into its discussion. Third, the different policy 
proposals that were generated are debated by participants inside and outside of the government. 
In Kingdon’s words, solutions are coupled with problems. Finally, a policy choice is made. Each 
of these stages is determinative of the final policy outcome and is prone to manipulation and 
strategic behavior (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The processes of decision making of AUGE 
and AUS are compared over these four stages. 
The processes of decision making of these two cases share a central commonality: the 
dominant role of the presidents as agenda-setters. Presidents are often preeminent actors of the 
agenda setting process since they are at the center of public attention and have important 
resources such as party leadership and media coverage (IDB 2006, Kingdon 2010). The cases of 
AUGE and AUS show us this key feature of policymaking. Nevertheless, the kinds of party 
leadership established by Lagos and García are divergent; hence their effects over the policy 
decision making process are different. 
Enhancing equality in the provision of health was a clear priority for the Chilean 
president. A comprehensive health care reform was a key part of Lagos’ programmatic proposals 
made during his presidential campaign (Dávila 2005). His program To Growth with Equality 
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discusses health reform as one of its major points –after economic growth and education-, 
emphasizing the need for timely and quality services for all Chileans. The program also promises 
the creation of a Solidarity Fund that would consist of state transfers and citizens’ contributions. 
Lagos was elected in March 2000. Early on in his term, the president established the Comisión 
para la Reforma, an inter-ministerial commission in charge of the study and proposal of reform 
to the health system. 
The argument that Lagos used to introduce the issue of health reform to the political 
agenda was a key strategic move. With a majority in Congress, his leftist Concertación faced a 
strong coalition of center-right and right political parties in the opposition: Alianza por Chile, 
formed by Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN). Based on 
extensive interviews with members of both government and opposition, Pribble (2013) shows 
that the great financial pressure on the public sector, which gained importance at the end of the 
1990s, was highlighted by Lagos and his coalition in order to convince the opposition of the need 
for a reform. In 2002, the inter-ministerial commission proposed a reform of the segmented 
health care system introducing the AUGE law proposal. In May of this year, Lagos officially 
announced the AUGE plan during his annual speech and the bill was sent to the Chamber of 
Deputies.  
Following the official procedure, the bill was assigned to the pertinent committees, 
Health and Finance. The Finance Committee held 2 hearings in June of 2002 and the Health 
Committee held 18 hearings between June and November of 2002. After intense discussion, 
AUGE finally reached floor debate in December. 
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President Lagos, as the leader of a coalition formed by programmatic parties such as the 
Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Democrats (PDC), and the Party for Democracy (PPD) took 
the opportunity to introduce a programmatically defined policy proposal backed up by the 
coalition in government, Concertación. Thus, the Chilean president exercised his leadership, 
pushing for an institutional reform in alignment with his partisan values.  
 In Peru, between December 2006 and January 2007, six bills referring to universal health 
care were sent to Congress. First, a bill developed by the left-wing parliamentary group 
Nationalist-Union for Peru
4
, proposing the universalization of the whole system of social 
security that included three subsystems for pensions, health, and occupational hazards. Then, a 
bill by the right-wing party National Unity (Unidad Nacional) proposed the creation of a system 
of universal health insurance. Third, a bill developed by APRA, President García’s center-right 
party, at the initiative of Congressman Luis Wilson, proposing the creation of an Essential 
Package for Health Insurance (PEAS). This package established the health services that all health 
insurance institutions, public and private, were bound to fulfill. Two more bills from the 
Nationalist Party followed: one by Congresswoman Sucari that repeated bill number one, and a 
bill by Congressman Escudero that incorporated the creation of a Solidarity Fund, which would 
integrate private and public sector funds. Finally, APRA introduced a second bill, again at the 
initiative of Congressman Wilson, which articulated his original proposal for the creation of 
PEAS with the creation of a system of universal health insurance originally proposed by National 
Unity.  
                                                          
4
 This coalition between the Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista) and Union for Peru (Unión por el Perú) 
supported current President Ollanta Humala’s campaign for the 2006 presidential election, which he lost against 
Alan García. 
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 The bills were assigned to both the Health Committee and the Social Security Committee 
in Congress. The Social Security Committee
5
 held two hearings in June and July of 2007 and 
then required the issue to be debated on the floor. The debate about universal health insurance 
never reached the floor at this time.  
 It was not until February 2008 that the issue came back to the political agenda when 
President García established a commission chaired by the Ministry of Health in charge of 
proposing the necessary mechanisms that would allow the implementation of the Universal 
Health Insurance (AUS). The Health Committee in Congress held nine hearings between 
September and December 2008. The committee voted on and approved unanimously a bill that 
essentially referred to the last bill developed by APRA the year before. This bill was sent to floor 
debate. Exactly one week after this, President García sent the AUS bill to Congress. This was 
almost an exact copy of the bill issued by the Health Committee. This bill was not assigned to 
any committee in Congress but was attached to the Health Committee bill, disregarding the 
normal procedure, and sent directly to floor debate, which took place in March 2009.  
 The presence of six different bills was not enough to take the issue of universal health 
insurance to floor debate two years before, but the role of two party leaders was decisive later on: 
APRA’s Luis Wilson, President of the Health Committee in Congress, and APRA’s leader and 
then President of Peru, Alan García. Both bills presented by APRA prior to the debate were 
presented at the initiative of Wilson and with the support of other members of the party. It is 
surprising that a center-right party like APRA decided to promote a policy proposal to provide 
universal access to health services. However, the proposal is poorly specified in terms of which 
                                                          
5
 The President of the Committee was Nationalist Martha Acosta. 
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diseases PEAS would include and how the policy would be funded. According to information 
provided by an APRA member who was part of the Health Committee during that period 
(Personal Interview), Wilson takes his proposal to García right before the President sent the AUS 
bill to Congress. That could allegedly explain why both proposals look nearly identical. 
Moreover, when asked about where García’s interest for AUS came from, the APRA member 
replied: “The president does not know [the topic], but he knows that it is ‘political’…If it is 
announced: ‘starting from tomorrow everybody will have access to free health services’, then 
everyone says ‘bravo, applauses, this is my President!’” 
 The incentives to carry out health reform in the cases of Lagos in Chile and García in 
Peru might somehow seem similar. In both cases, problems of lack of resources and access to 
health services were perceived to be urgent. Nevertheless, whereas President Lagos took the 
opportunity to introduce a programmatically defined policy proposal backed by the coalition in 
government, Concertación; in Peru, a strong leader of a weakly programmatic party saw an 
opportunity to get a boost in popularity and promoted a loosely defined bill. 
 The role of the president proves to be very important for the agenda setting process of the 
two health reform policies analyzed in this paper, but for different reasons. In Chile, President 
Lagos was responsible for the introduction of AUGE for debate in Congress, through a 
programmatic push built on his left-wing partisan guidelines. Instead, in Peru, President García 
did not have any programmatic commitment to universal health care, but saw an opportunity to 
increase his own popularity.  
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V. Policy Dimensions and Debate 
Political parties and politicians as individuals have an important type of power: the power to 
limit the scope of the political process for certain issues of their interest (Bachrach and Baratz 
1962), but also specific parts of the issue to be discussed. When analyzing the process of agenda 
setting, a key factor needs to be taken into account: the development of policy images. 
Baumgartner and Jones (2009) explain how the competition among different interpretations of 
policy issues is essential to the understanding of both stability and change within the political 
agenda. A particular issue can be viewed from different perspectives and hence different 
definitions are constructed and promoted (Chong and Druckman 2007). Therefore, different 
frames may be used by the multitude of actors discussing a certain issue, emphasizing particular 
ideas. Moreover, highlighting a particular subset of aspects of an issue may have an important 
effect on people’s opinions since these opinions will be focused on those emphasized aspects of 
the issue (Druckman 2001).  
When an issue is being debated, in Congress or informally among politicians, research 
shows that the frames used by media to cover the issue can often lead politicians to adopt the 
same frames used by the media outlets (Rogers and Dearing 1994, Edwards and Wood 1999). 
Another body of research focuses on media following frames used by politicians (Entman 2004; 
Fridkin & Kenney 2005).  
In order to assess how similar or different the frames used by media and congressmen 
during the floor debate of AUGE in Chile
6
 were, I conducted a systematic assessment of media 
                                                          
6
 Data is not available for the Peruvian case. No single major newspaper keeps online archives of their articles. The 
furthest back one of the major newspapers, El Comercio, goes is 2011. 
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coverage. Further, I analyzed congressional debates from both Chile and Peru, looking at how 
different frames were used across countries and within countries by the different political parties.  
First, I did a search for “garantías explícitas” (explicit guarantees) at the online archives 
of the Chilean Newspaper El Mercurio
7
 for the period of time between the beginning of the 
debate (May 2002) until the approval of the proposal (August 2004). The search gave a total of 
78 articles, of which 60 were related to AUGE
8
. After reading each story, I developed a list of 
key dimensions under which the media discussed AUGE: funding, health needs, the role of the 
private sector, redistribution and equity, government management, and growth. Then, I traced 
the attention given to these attributes by the media articles by counting the number of paragraphs 
that used each particular frame and recording whether the frame was used in favor (pro) or 
against (anti) AUGE. 
Second, I traced the use of the same frames in the floor debates from the Chilean 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate. I carefully read the transcriptions from the five debates that 
took place in the Parliament
9
. I recorded the number of paragraphs referring to each attribute of 
the discussion. The growth frame did not appear as important, but two new frames, coverage and 
consensus, were identified. Table 1 shows the arguments from each frame used to discuss 
AUGE. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 El Mercurio is the only main newspaper in the country that provides free access to its online archives. 
8
 Some of them were discussing health reforms in other countries, mainly in the United States. 
9
 Two debates in the Chamber of Deputies (December of 2002, and January of 2003), two in the Senate (May and 
August, 2004), and a final one in the Chamber of Deputies in August of 2004 
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Table 1 
Frames used to discuss AUGE in Chile 
Frame Pro-AUGE arguments Anti-AUGE arguments 
Funding
10
 Fair to raise taxes to tobacco, alcoholic 
drinks, and diesel. 
Resources should come from an increase in 
Value Added Tax 
Fair to use a portion of private insurance 
premiums 
Not enough resources.  
Resources should not come from an 
increase in taxes.  
Resources should not come from private 
insurance premiums  
Health Needs Can solve long waiting lists 
Can solve the problem of access to services  
Can improve the quality of attention 
Can make services less expensive 
Health is a right 
None 
Role of the 
Private Sector  
Private sector only cares about its own profit 
Private sector needs to be regulated due to 
high costs and discrimination by sex and age 
Private sector provides better services 
than public sector 
People should be able to choose between 
the private and public sectors 
Redistribution 
& Equity  
 
 
 
 
There should exist solidarity between rich and 
poor, between private and public sector 
Risk should be shared  
Poor people should receive the same quality 
of services as wealthier people 
People who can afford attention in the 
private sector do not need to be 
responsible for those who cannot 
Solidarity Fund is unconstitutional  
Management Can make government’s management of 
resources more efficient  
Can solve problems of bureaucratic 
administration 
Government is not able to manage 
resources efficiently 
Reform will not solve the problem of 
lack of resources (technology, hospitals, 
physicians) 
Public sector will not be ready for the 
increase in demand 
Growth None Reform goes against pro-growth agenda 
Rise in taxes is detrimental for economic 
growth 
Against free competition of health 
services markets 
                                                          
10
 A separate bill discussed the funding of AUGE, together with the funding of other social reforms promoted by the 
Lagos Administration. Only the increase to VAT was approved. 
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Coverage Covering 56 diseases is great progress 
Coverage will not affect attention to diseases 
that are not considered under the 56 selected 
Prioritization is needed due to scarce 
resources 
Covering 56 diseases is not enough, 
more should be covered 
Attention to diseases that are not 
included will be affected 
 
Consensus Reform brings all parties together 
All parties participated in the debate 
Reform without political consensus 
would fail 
Consensus is not possible since right-
wing parties are allied with the private 
sector 
Right-wing parties forced Concertación 
to abandon the Solidarity Fund 
 
Third, in order to compare the debates from Chile and Peru, I traced the attention to same 
set of frames for the two floor debates that were held in the Peruvian Congress. In addition to the 
frames mentioned earlier, two more dimensions were important during the discussion of AUS in 
Peru: social security reform, and single fund. Table 2 shows the arguments used for the 
discussion of AUS. 
Table 2 
Frames used to discuss AUS in Peru 
Frame Pro-AUS arguments Anti-AUS arguments 
Funding Funds will come from state taxes 
Responsibility of the Executive to determine 
the budget 
Need to know where the funding will 
come from 
AUS needs permanent and sustainable 
funding 
Health Needs Can solve the problem of out of pocket 
expenses 
Can solve the problem of access to services  
Can improve the quality of attention 
Health is a right 
None 
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Privatization None AUS has a privatizing role since it will 
bring more business to the private sector 
Poverty & 
Equity  
 
 
Poor people are the most affected by the 
current system 
Poor people should receive the same quality 
of services as wealthier people 
None 
 
 
Management Can make government’s management of 
resources more efficient  
Can solve problems of bureaucratic 
administration  
AUS will not solve the problem of 
fragmentation 
Government is not able to manage 
resources efficiently 
AUS will not solve the problem of lack 
of resources (technology, hospitals, 
physicians, medicines) 
Coverage PEAS will be determined by the adequate 
epidemiologic studies 
Coverage of other diseases will not be 
affected  
Prioritization is needed due to scarce 
resources 
Coverage will not be enough 
Attention to diseases that are not 
included will be affected 
 
Social Security 
Reform 
Does not make sense to mix pensions, health, 
and occupational hazards 
Unconstitutional since pension funds are 
intangible 
AUS is not enough: the universalization 
of the whole system of social security 
(pensions, health, and occupational 
hazards) is needed 
Consensus Reform brings all parties together There was no consensus on AUS 
Social Security Committee was excluded 
Not enough time to debate 
 
i. Media Coverage and Congressional Debates in Chile 
The comparison between media coverage regarding AUGE and the floor debates in Congress 
show important contrasts (See Figures 1 and 2). First, media coverage was far more negative 
than the floor debates in regard to the reform. Essentially, two factors explain this trend: El 
Mercurio is a newspaper that tends to have a conservative view on many issues, members of the 
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coalition in government, Concertación, were more active than opposition members, and when 
AUGE got to the floor there was already some agreement between Concertación and the 
opposition in terms of the need for the reform. 
Second, the distribution of frames in news stories has a more even spread, whereas the 
floor debates emphasize those frames related to the proposed benefits of AUGE (health benefits, 
redistribution and equity, and coverage) the most. 
Finally, whereas the most prominent frames that media used to cover the proposal was 
management, redistribution and equity was the most prominent frame used by legislators. News 
stories made an emphasis on the inability of government to efficiently manage public resources. 
According to several stories, a clear sign of inefficiency was the scarcity of technology, 
hospitals, and physicians in the public health sector, which in turn would make the 
implementation of AUGE very hard. The management frame was fairly prominent at floor 
debates as well. However, this dimension was also used to express support for the reform and not 
just to delegitimize it, by showing AUGE as a possible solution to the lack of efficiency. In 
Congress, several legislators referred to redistribution and equity as a dimension in favor of the 
reform, arguing that it was time for the government to guarantee equal access and quality of 
services for all Chileans no matter their economic condition. This dimension was also prominent 
for the media, but it was divided among anti- and pro-AUGE arguments. 
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Figure 1: Number of stories for each frame that were coded pro, anti, or neutral 
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Figure 2: Number of paragraphs in floor debates for each frame that were coded pro, anti, or 
neutral 
 
 
ii. Debate and Policy Choice in Chile 
After the hearings held by the Health and Finance Committees in the Chamber of Deputies, 
between June and November 2002, the AUGE bill went to floor debate for the first time for 
General Discussion. A key change was made to the bill by the Health Committee in regards to 
the Solidarity Fund; this will now be a mechanism that aimed to redistribute the costs of AUGE 
across ISAPRES (private sector) affiliates within the private sector. Members of PDC, PPD, PS, 
                                                                                                                                         
 
26 
 
and PRSD introduced the change. There was agreement that funds from the public sector should 
not be transferred to the private one since it was the source of inequity due to risk discrimination. 
On the floor, the bill was discussed and approved with 89 votes in favor and the 
abstention of Congresswoman Lily Pérez from National Renewal (RN), one of the right-wing 
parties that composed the opposition coalition, Alianza por Chile. In January 2003 a second floor 
debate took place, Specific Discussion, where each individual article of the bill was discussed 
and voted on. The right-wing parties Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National 
Renewal (RN) voted against 11 articles of the bill. Most of them referred to the creation of the 
Solidarity Fund and the Maternity Fund, which would cover maternity leave with resources from 
members of the public and private sector. However, with the votes of the members of the 
incumbent Concertación all the articles were approved, which meant that the funds were 
maintained.  
AUGE was sent to discussion in the Senate committees. However, the Concertación 
government asked the Health Committee to eliminate the articles regarding the Maternity Fund. 
Osvaldo Artaza, Minister of Health during the time, stated during the first hearing that: “with the 
goal of generating broader political agreements, which can make the reform viable… the articles 
that referred to the Maternity Fund were eliminated”. 
The Finance Committee in the Senate held one hearing in July of 2003 and the Health 
Committee held 19 hearings between August of 2003 and May of 2004. The creation of a 
Solidarity Fund and was strongly opposed within the Health Committee. The opposition came 
from the right, who argued that the fund was unconstitutional as it was a violation of property 
rights. Moreover, that it reduced the choices available to users since they would feel obliged to 
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resort to the public sector because their costs would be lower than if affiliated to a private sector 
entity. In that context, the government decided that the Solidarity Fund should be removed from 
the proposal since there was no agreement over it with the right parties and their support was 
important in order to pass the floor vote in the Senate
11
.  
During floor debate, Senator Mariano Ruiz-Esquide (PDC), President of the Health 
Committee, explained that through the political agreement reached between Alianza and 
Concertación Senators it was decided to eliminate the Solidarity Fund and substitute it for a 
universal premium (prima universal) that would be taken from the current premiums of affiliates 
to the public and private sectors, with the exception of groups A and B from FONASA
12
. The 
Senate approved the reformed AUGE in General Discussion with 42 votes in favor and one vote 
against from Senator Nelson Ávila (PPD), who argued that the Solidarity Fund was the core of 
the project. 
AUGE returned to the floor at the Chamber of Deputies in August of 2004 to be 
discussed and voted on the amendments made by the Senate. The elimination of the Solidarity 
Fund was approved with 75 votes in favor, 8 against, and 26 abstentions. The abstentions came 
from PS, PPD, and PRSD, whereas the votes against came from PPD members, and two PDC 
members (Cornejo and Saffirio). According to Pribble (2013), such layout can be explained since 
many legislators were convinced that, although equity-enhancing, the fund was not an essential 
financial pillar of the reform. Nevertheless, several Concertación members showed their 
                                                          
11
 The Senate was composed by 38 members: 20 from Concertación, of which 13 were from PDC, 5 from PS, and 2 
from PPD), and 16 from Alianza, with 9 UDI members and 7 RN members. Moreover, there were 2 independents 
(Matthei and Arancibia) that usually leaned with Alianza. 
12
 FONASA would cover the total value of their universal premiums for poor people and people with an monthly 
income equal or lower to 210.001 pesos (38 US Dollars). 
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discontent with the elimination of the Fund. On the other side, members of Alianza manifested 
their dissatisfaction with the fact that groups A and B from FONASA would have their universal 
premiums completely covered. 
We can observe these opposing dynamics through the systematic analysis of floor debates 
carried out for this paper. As mentioned in the previous section, redistribution and equity was the 
most prominent frame used by legislators. Nevertheless, as Figure 2 shows, within this frame, 
both arguments pro- and anti-AUGE were used. The partition came from the left-right division 
within Congress. Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of frames used by the incumbent, 
Concertación, and the opposition, Alianza. 
Whereas the redistribution and equity frame was always used as an argument in favor of 
the reform by members of the left-wing coalition, this frame was mainly used as an argument 
against AUGE by Alianza. Along with their programmatic alignments, several legislators from 
UDI and RN argued that people who can afford attention in the private sector do not need to be 
responsible for those who cannot afford to do so. Also, that the creation of the Solidarity Fund 
was unconstitutional since it was an assault against private property. It is important to notice that 
the majority of the pro-AUGE arguments on redistribution and equity from Alianza (12 out of 
14) are from the three last debates when the Solidarity Fund and the Maternity Funds were 
already eliminated. Then, these legislators emphasized that AUGE was going to put an end to the 
inequality of services between poor and rich since everyone would be guaranteed the coverage of 
the 56 selected diseases. 
Furthermore, we can observe that members of Alianza share a preoccupation about the 
inefficiency of the government to manage public resources. Particularly, legislators mention the 
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mismanagement of resources in the public health sector, where the scarcity of technology, 
hospitals, and physicians is a clear sign of the inability to allocate resources properly. In general, 
the right-wing parties argued that AUGE ran the risk of being a failure since the government was 
incapable. However, it is important to point out that the members of the opposition were not the 
only ones addressing the management problem in the government. Concertación also uses the 
frame, but in this case in favor of the reform. The coalition in government acknowledges the 
problem and the need for a better handling of resources. Turning it to their side, they argue that 
the reform will solve the problem. 
Finally, the role of the private sector is clearly a source of tension between Concertación 
and Alianza. Left-wing legislators argue that the private ISAPRES only care about their own 
profit leaving aside the health of Chileans, and that they need to be regulated due to the 
systematic discrimination they enforce by punishing people with high risk with higher premiums. 
Conversely, right-wing legislators strongly opposed the initiative to make ISAPRES’ affiliates to 
contribute to a Solidarity Fund in addition to their premiums since that would be an incentive for 
people to switch to the public sector. Along this line, the legislators argued that it was unfair to 
punish the private sector in that way, especially since they are able to provide better services than 
the public sector. 
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Figure 3: Number of paragraphs in floor debates for each frame used by Concertación members 
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Figure 4: Number of paragraphs in floor debates for each frame used by Alianza members 
 
The process of decision making that AUGE went through reflects the impact of the 
presence of programmatic political parties. First, at the party level, we can observe that the 
members of Concertación backed President Lagos’ agenda to enact AUGE as it was in line with 
their shared ideological commitments to provide universal access to quality health services. 
Moreover, they legislated along the ideological guidelines that defined the coalition, 
emphasizing the need for redistribution and equity in the health system, as well as pointing out 
the responsibility of the private sector for the existing inequity. Nevertheless, Concertación’s 
goal to enhance redistribution and solidarity in the health system was hindered by a strong 
programmatic opposition, Alianza por Chile, who resisted the creation of redistribution 
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mechanisms and defended the private sector’s interests. As Pribble (2013) suggests, the 
commitments of the right, especially UDI, were strengthened when the interest of the private 
sector were at stake. 
Previous studies (Dávila 2005, Pribble 2013) have emphasized the lack of discipline of 
some Concertación members, especially from PDC, since they opposed the creation of the 
Solidarity Fund, or in any case, did not vote against the modification to eliminate it. However, 
the analysis of hearings and floor debates does not show that trend. First of all, Senators 
Boeninger and Ruiz Esquide from PDC and Viera Gallo from PS voted in favor of the articles 
that referred to the fund in the Health Committee
13
. Moreover, it can be argued that if some 
Deputies voted in favor of the modification or abstained, it was because the government 
(President Lagos and the Minister of Health) had already decided to remove the fund from the 
proposal since it caused great conflict with the opposition parties. The coalition in government 
was looking to pass a reform with broad consensus. Speeches made by Concertación members 
during the debates, including the Ministry of Health (PDC), show that they were looking to get 
Alianza on board and make it clear that the reform was being approved by –and thus would be 
the responsibility of- both coalitions. 
Second, at the party system level, both opposition and government followed their 
programmatic guidelines, which propelled an intense deliberative process since the parties 
promoted and pushed for the consideration of their commitments. Conflict was high, and 
together with the different stages that a policy has to go through in Chile’s bicameral legislature, 
the debate went for a total of two years.  
                                                          
13
 The other two members, Matthei (UDI) and Espina (RN) abstained arguing unconstitutionality. 
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The final policy choice was not entirely what the left wanted since the redistribution 
mechanisms of the original proposal were rejected; neither was the policy completely what the 
right wanted because a universal premium was still going to be taken from the contribution of 
ISAPRES’ affiliates. However, AUGE had clear definitions and viable objectives which, as will 
be discussed later, had important implications for its further implementation.  
iii. Debate and Policy Choice in Peru 
In December 2008, the Health Committee in Congress voted on and unanimously approved a bill 
that essentially referred to the bill developed by APRA the year before, which proposed a 
regulatory framework of universal health insurance (AUS). The bill included the Essential Plan 
for Health Insurance (PEAS), a set of benefits and guarantees of health services that all citizens 
would have access to for a prioritized list of diseases, under the public and private sector. The 
votes in favor came from 4 APRA members, including the President of the Committee (Luis 
Wilson), 2 members of the right-wing party National Solidarity (Solidaridad Nacional), a 
legislator from Fujimorista Party
14
, and an independent legislator
15
. The three members of the 
left-wing Nationalist Party were not present, neither was the member of the left-wing Union for 
Peru (UPP)
16
. 
Exactly a week after, President García sent a bill to Congress, which was almost an exact 
copy of the bill issued by the Health Committee. This bill was not assigned to any committee in 
Congress but was attached to the Health Committee bill and sent directly to floor debate. During 
                                                          
14
 A personalistic party created around the figure of ex-President and dictator Alberto Fujimori. 
15
 Margarita Sucari was elected as a member of Partido Nacionalista and then became independent.  
16
 The Nationalist Sumire and UPP’s Escudero had official permission to be absent due to travel and health 
problems, respectively.  
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floor debate, Nationalist Congressman Víctor Mayorga (President of the Social Security 
Committee) shows his disapproval for this violation of congressional regulations. The President 
of the Health Committee, Luis Wilson (APRA), responds to this complaint arguing that the 
Executive sent this very similar proposal to make it clear that they supported AUS. Therefore, it 
made sense to attach the executive bill to the one approved by the committee. 
In March of 2009, AUS is discussed on the floor. The bill was approved with 62 votes in 
favor, 21 against, and 1 abstention. The votes in favor came from the center-right APRA, the 
right-wing parties National Unity, National Solidarity, and the Fujimorista Party, the left-wing 
party Union for Peru (UPP), and 5 independent congressmen. The votes against AUS came from 
the Nationalist Party, and 3 congressmen from center parties
17
. Congressman Juan D. Perry 
(National Solidarity) abstained.  
A systematic analysis of the floor debates in the Peruvian Congress show the main 
dynamics between parties. In the first place, in contrast to the debate in Chile, there was no 
debate about redistribution, neither between the rich and the poor nor between those with low 
and high risks. Nevertheless, as Figure 5 shows, poverty and equity was the most prominent 
frame in the debates. There was consensus across parties about the need for universal health 
insurance in order to give access to quality health services to poor people. AUS established that 
the coverage would be completely free for the poor and extreme poor. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Yonhy Lescano and Víctor A. García Belaúnde from Popular Action (Acción Popular) and Carlos Bruce from 
Possible Peru (Perú Posible) 
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Figure 5: Number of paragraphs in floor debates for each frame that were coded pro, anti, or 
neutral 
 
Many sources of tension between left- and right-wing parties appeared during the 
debates. Figure 7 shows that the distribution of anti-AUS arguments used by UPP and the 
Nationalist Party has an even spread. One of the main dimensions used to disapprove of the 
government’s proposal was that it did not include the sources of funding for the reform, and 
hence it would not be sustainable over time. The bill only mentioned that the funds would come 
from state taxes and APRA members emphasized that the Executive would be in charge of 
determining the details once AUS was approved. Another source of disapproval was that AUS 
was going to serve the purpose of privatizing the health system by bringing more business to the 
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private sector. Although this argument was emphasized a lot, especially by members of the 
Nationalist Party, none of them developed the logic behind it. Moreover, it was argued that the 
reform would not address the core problem of lack of resources, such as hospitals, physicians, 
and medicines, as well as the governmental inefficiency to manage public resources.  
The limited scope of the reform was another point highlighted by the opposition. UPP 
and the Nationalist Party argued that a reform of the whole social security system, including 
pensions and occupational hazards, was needed. However, APRA members refuted that point by 
stating that it was nonsense to mix the discussion of health with pensions and occupational 
hazards. Despite the opposition to AUS shown by both UPP and the Nationalist Party during 
floor debate, the 14 members of UPP that were present voted in favor of AUS, thus leaving the 
Nationalists alone. 
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Figure 6: Number of paragraphs in floor debates for each frame used by right-wing party 
members 
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Figure 7: Number of paragraphs in floor debates for each frame used by left-wing party members 
 
The analysis of the process of decision making of AUS in Peru shows us the significant 
implications that the presence of weakly programmatic parties have on the development of 
policy proposals, debate, and policy choice. President García, leader of the center-right party 
APRA, which is mainly based around his persona, decided to back a proposal that was unclear in 
terms of the number of diseases that it would cover and had no clear funding source. For García, 
promoting AUS was seen as a source to boost his popularity from a reform that was big in name 
and objectives but short in design and strategy. APRA was a disciplined party; very rarely did its 
members vote against proposals that the party president, Alan García, supported. This case was 
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not an exception and its 24 members (the biggest group in Congress) voted in favor. APRA 
members followed García’s direction even if that meant the support for a very shallow bill. 
The opposition parties, UPP and the Nationalist Party failed to contend the policy 
proposal in a clear manner. They accused AUS of intending to privatize the health system but did 
not explain how. Also, one of their main arguments against AUS was that a broader reform that 
would include pensions and occupational hazards was better, which did not really oppose the 
proposal per se. Unexpectedly, when the proposal was voted on at the floor, UPP stepped to the 
side and decided to support AUS and vote in favor. 
The low levels of programmatic competition present in the Peruvian Congress 
discouraged the development of an exhaustive debate. APRA was interested in the approval of a 
reform that was poorly defined, the left-wing parties were not able to provide clear arguments 
against the bill, and the other right-wing parties were nearly absent during the debates. Other 
than APRA members, only one legislator from National Solidarity, a member of the Health 
Committee, was active in the debate. We could argue that the right-wing parties did not 
participate because they perceived that the passage of the bill did not represent a concern since it 
was not going to make any major change, but a possible source of popularity. 
Congress approved a loosely specified policy with unclear objectives, which had severe 
implications for its own implementation. García’s boost in popularity was ephemeral and today 
most Peruvians are not aware of the existence of a universal health insurance.    
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VI. Implementation 
The process of policy decision making of the health reform proposals in Chile and Peru had 
important implications for the implementation of the reforms in each country. Two main aspects 
are central to the comparison of the consequences of the presence of strongly programmatic 
parties versus weakly programmatic parties and their final policy choice. 
 First, both reforms considered a prioritized list of diseases that would be covered for 
timely and quality services. In the case of Chile, AUGE established that it would be 56 illnesses 
that according to the studies developed by the Ministry of Health were responsible for the 
majority of health problems of the population. In Peru, AUS did not establish a number but 
stated that the Ministry of Health would be in charge of determining which diseases the Essential 
Plan for Health Insurance (PEAS) would cover after the approval of the law. Moreover, both the 
Chilean and Peruvian proposals for universal coverage established that the list would be 
evaluated every two years in order to progressively include more diseases that, according to 
epidemiological studies, were a priority to cover. 
In Chile, AUGE has been implemented and is enforced at every public and private 
facility. As the norm established, the diseases covered by AUGE are considered every two years. 
According to Pribble, this “provides the Chilean state with an effective tool for responding to 
changes in the epidemiological profile of the country, thus ensuring that guarantees respond to 
the health care needs of citizens” (2013: 56) 
In Peru, Congress approved AUS in March of 2009 and PEAS was presented by the 
Ministry of Health in June of 2009 and established the coverage of 144 diseases. However, the 
plan has not been enforced at public neither at private facilities. According to an ex-executive 
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from the Ministry of Health and the National Institute of Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud), 
PEAS is an excess, offering more than the system is able to provide (Personal Interview). 
Moreover, a current executive at the Ministry of Health stated that the García Administration 
rushed to approve a list of prioritized diseases and the respective services, which  both the public 
and private sector were bound to fulfill, that “does not match reality” (Personal Interview)18. 
According to both executives, now it would be politically costly for the current Minister to 
reduce the plan. As the Executive Director of one of the hospitals run by the Ministry of Health 
confirmed, PEAS is simply not enforced (Personal Interview). Further, the list, contrary to what 
the AUS law says, has not been revised since 2009. 
 Second, Chile and Peru shared a central commonality at the time that their reforms were 
introduced: the precariousness of their public health system, which the majority of citizens used, 
in terms of lack of infrastructure and human resources that caused long waiting lists. The few 
who could afford to resort to the private sector had to keep up with the high costs of services and 
discrimination due to gender and age. Both AUGE and AUS were looking to reach equity in the 
health system, to get over the segmentation of the system and ensure quality of health services 
for all their citizens regardless of their incomes.  
In Chile, the reform has guaranteed timely and quality services for, as of today, 80 
different diseases
19
, in the public FONASA and the private ISAPRES. Therefore, great progress 
has been made in terms of generating equity of coverage and services across systems (Pribble 
                                                          
18
 In a personal interview, an APRA member stated that “there was no time to do it properly… he [García] was 
leaving office.” 
19
 The last revision in July of 2013 increased the number of diseases to 80. 
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2013). The long waiting lists and high costs in the private sector were alleviated for, as of today, 
80 diseases included in the plan.  
In Peru, although the public and private sectors are legally required to comply with 
PEAS, as previously discussed, there is no enforcement. Currently, both public and private 
facilities provide the guarantees specified by PEAS as their resources allow them to do so. The 
main problem in the public sector is that, although AUS established that the poor and extreme 
poor would not pay for health services, the issue of out of pocket expenses remains. The 
Executive Director of one of the hospitals run by the Ministry of Health explained that people 
still needs to pay for medicines since the drugstores in the public health facilities often do not 
have them (Personal Interview). Moreover, the problem of lack of infrastructure and physicians 
persist, causing long waiting lists, which continues to force people –who can afford it- to resort 
to the private sector although most struggle to afford their high costs. 
In a personal interview, an APRA member who manifested his concern about the poor 
implementation of AUS expressed: “how do you launch universal insurance without having the 
elements to implement them?” When asked whether that was not the responsibility of the whole 
party since it was them who promoted and passed the law, he said: “No, the law is good… the 
problem was in the planning and implementation of it.”(Personal Interview) 
Contrary to what this APRA member manifests, the policy decision making of the law 
made a difference for the implementation of the reform in Peru. Both processes are not entirely 
disconnected. Congress passed a law without a prioritized list of diseases, without clear rules for 
its enforcement, and that did not consider an exhaustive study of the fit between rule and reality. 
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As of today, whereas AUGE has had important effects on the quality of services Chileans 
have in the public and private sectors; in Peru, the segmented system persists, causing serious 
problems of quality in the services provided and inequality between the poor and the wealthier 
citizens. The final policy output in each of the countries this paper analyzed had different 
impacts from the level of technical development of the reform. 
 
Conclusions 
Research on the development of universal health policy in Latin American countries has focused 
on countries with strong political parties of the left who were the leaders of reforms that aimed at 
the universalization of the distribution of health services to their populations, such as Chile, 
Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Moreover, the political parties in these countries show strong 
programmatic commitments to their party programs. Nevertheless, there is a pending research 
agenda in the study of universal health reform in countries without strongly programmatic left-
wing parties, and in which parties of the center-right have led the reform, such as Peru, 
Colombia, and Mexico.  
In the region, we have seen the disappearance of many programmatic political parties and 
the development of weakly or non-programmatic ones (Levitsky 2001, Mainwaring and Zoco 
2007, Kitschelt et al. 2010). Surprisingly, this phenomenon has been overlooked in terms of 
policy decision making. This paper incorporated the strength of the programmatic nature of 
political parties as an independent variable explaining the process of decision making and its 
distinct outputs.  
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 This paper compared the cases of Chile and Peru. Both countries enacted reforms, in 
2004 and 2009 respectively, that looked to overcome inequity in the health system caused due to 
the segmentation between public and private sector, and ensure quality health services for all 
their citizens. Nonetheless, the process of policymaking that AUGE in Chile and AUS in Peru 
went through and their final policy choices were very different. 
 In Chile, there was a strong coalition involved in the reform, with President Ricardo 
Lagos at its head. Formed by center and left-wing parties, Concertación promoted a reform that 
was in line with their programmatic commitments. A systematic analysis of the floor debates 
shows that its members legislated along the ideological guidelines that defined the coalition, 
emphasizing the need for redistribution and equity in the health system, as well as pointing out 
the responsibility of the private sector for the existing inequity. Conversely, in Peru, the weakly 
programmatic center-right party in government, APRA, and its leader Alan García, promoted a 
poorly defined bill. President García did not have any programmatic commitment to universal 
health care, but saw an opportunity to increase his own popularity. 
 Concertación’s goal to enhance redistribution and solidarity in the health system was 
hindered by a strong programmatic opposition, Alianza por Chile, who resisted the creation of 
redistribution mechanisms and defended the private sector’s interests. The collision with the 
right propelled an intense deliberation, but also forced the government to eliminate the creation 
of the Solidarity and the Maternity Funds since it was looking to pass a reform with broad 
consensus. Concertación members made it clear during the floor debates that they were looking 
to get Alianza on board and stated that the reform was being approved by both coalitions. APRA, 
in turn, did not face a strong opposition. The opposition parties, UPP and the Nationalist Party 
failed to contend the policy proposal in a clear manner. They accused AUS of intending to 
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privatize the health system but did not explain how. Further, when the proposal was voted on, 
UPP voted in favor. The low levels of programmatic competition present in the Peruvian 
Congress discouraged the development of an exhaustive debate. 
 The final policy passed in Chile had clear definitions and viable objectives which had 
important implications for its further implementation, and ultimately had great effects on the 
generation of equity regarding access to and quality of health services. In Peru, Congress 
approved a policy that did not specify which and what number of diseases would be covered 
neither how it would be funded over time. As of today, the effects of AUS in the unequal health 
system in Peru have been limited. The process of implementation of a policy is not isolated from 
the debates and decisions that lead to it.                                                                       
 The programmatic nature of parties has an impact on both the process of policymaking 
and the final policy choices. When it comes to health policy, good policy outputs, which are 
formulated to and extend better heath to significant numbers of people, are favored by the 
presence of programmatic parties of the left and center-left.  
 Further research should look at the development of reforms looking to enhance universal 
access and better quality of services in other countries with weakly and non-programmatic 
political parties. The cases of Peru and Chile are extremes in terms of how programmatic 
political parties are in these two countries. It is important to understand where major health 
proposals come from in cases where there is more variation in terms of how programmatic 
political parties of both the left- and right-wing are, such as Ecuador and Mexico. Moreover, 
analyzing a possible process of diffusion among political elites (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson 
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2006), which leads to political attention being garnered to the same issues at the same time 
across countries could lead to interesting findings. 
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